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Mexico's Failure to Punish Gender-Based Violence in Ciudad Julfrez and
Potential Avenues for Relief under US. Asylum Law

Introduction

This paper examines the phenomenon of gender-related violence in Ciudad J u k a ,
Mexico and surveys what legal mechanisms exist to protect the human rights of the women who

are being targeted there. The first section of the paper presents background information
regarding the violence in Ciudad Ju6rez. This section first explores the historical and economic
developments in Mexico that led to the migration of thousands of young, rural women to Ciudad
Juhez. I then discuss the nature of the violence against these women in Ciudad Juhez as it has
been reported by human rights agencies, journalists and scholars. Finally, I survey some of the
theories that have emerged to explain the pattern of violence against women in Ciudad Jutirez.
The second section of the paper probes what legal remedies are available through local,
state and federal authorities in Mexico to protect the women of Ciudad J u k fiom violence.
This section also discusses Mexico's human rights obligations under international human rights
instruments to which it is a party and to what extent those obligations translate into real
protection for the women of Ciudad Juhez. The data and commentary presented in this section
establish that: (1) Mexico has failed to protect the women of Ciudad J u h z by its inadequate
investigation of the murders, its inability to locate and prosecute the perpetrators, and its failure
to implement preventive measures; and (2) the international human rights regime, while raising
the profile of the murders and exerting considerable pressure on the Mexican government to take

meaningful steps to eradicate the violence, is not an effective mechanism for protecting the
women of Ciudad Juhrez.
The third section of the paper examines what relief might be available under United
States asylum law to women who are actual or potential victims of the violence in Ciudad Juirez.
This section presents an overview of U.S. asylum law, followed by a step-by-step analysis of
whether and under what circumstances these women could make successful asylum claims.
The paper concludes with a general assessment of the ''rule of law" in Mexico with
respect to the human rights of the women of Ciudad Juirez. This assessment is broken down
into three categories: (1) efficacy of the Mexican local and federal legal framework; (2) efficacy
of the relevant international human rights organizations; and (3) efficacy of international refugee
law as applied in the U.S.context. I also suggest topics for further research.
Section 1: Background

The implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in the mid1990's coincided with an increase in the murder rate of women in Ciudad ~uhrez.' That rate has
remained elevated and is proportionately higher than the rates for similarly situated cities and the
national average in ~exico.' Specifically, while homicide rates in Ciudad Juhrez increased for
both men and women between 1993 and 2001, the rate for women rose at double the rate for
men? Although exact numbers are difficult to establish, over 375 women have been murdered in
Ciudad Juirez, Mexico since 1993.~

'
2

Grace C. Spencer, Her Body is a Battlefied: 7iie Applicability of the Alien Tort Statute to Corporate Human
Rights Abuses in Juarez, Mexico, 40 GONZ.L. REV. 503,510 (2004-05).
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, The Situation of the Rights of Women in Ciudad Jluirez, Mexico:
The Right to be Free from Violence and Discrimination (Ma.3, 2003), fl 4, 42 (available at
http://www.cidh.oas.org!ann~~lrepI2002eng/~hap.vi.juarez.htm)
(last accessed Mar.26,2006) (IACHR Report).

IACHR Report, supra note 2,7 42.

Many of the victims have been young, employed by maquiladoras5 or were

student^.^

A

number of the victims were recent transplants to Ciudad J u k z who had migrated fiom other
parts of ~ e x i c o .Most
~ of the women are h m poor ba~kgrounds.~
Additionally, the killings
have been extremely brutal, involving sexual violence andlor beatings, strangulation or
stabbings? The bodies of the victims often bear signs of torture.1° For example, many of the
victims have been "mutilated . . . with breasts hacked off, objects thrust up body cavities and
deep slashes across [the] chest and face. . .."I1
The maquiladora industry in Mexico existed for many years prior to the passage of the
NAFTA.'* In the mid-1960s, Mexiw implemented the Border Industrialization Program (BE'),''
which created the conditions that gave rise to the maq~iladoras.'~Although NAFTA did not
cause the establishment of the first maquiladoras, the number of foreign-owned companies along

4

Sylvia Moreno, Unresolved Murders of Women Rankle in Mexican Border City; New State Oflcials Seek Justice
in Hundreds ofBungled Cases, WASH.
POST,Dec. 16,2005, at A30.

5

The terms "maquiladora"and "maquila"refer to assembly plants in Mexico that produce goods for export.
Spencer, supra note 1, at 510; IACHR Report, supra note 2,1[ 3; Amnesty International, Intolerable Killings: 10
years of abductions and murders of women in Ciudad Jucirez and Chihuahua, at 7 (Aug. 10, 2003) (available at
http:llweb.amnesty.org!librarylpdflAMR410262003ENGLISW$FiIelAMR4102603.pdf)(last accessed Mar. 26,
2006).

7

IACHR Report, supra note 2,1[ 44.
Intolerable Killings, supra note 6, at 7.
IACHR Report, supra note 2,7 4.

'O

Id., fl33,62.

I'

Linda Diebel, The murdered women ofJuarez, TORONTO
STAR,Feb. 19,2006, at A10.

I2

Griselda Vega, Student Note, Maquiladora's Lost Women: The Killing Fields of Mexico
N U C Providing the Needed Protection?, 4 J. GENDER
RACE & JUST. 137,144 (2000).

13

Jessica Livingston, Murder in Jucirez Gender, Semal Violence, and the Global Assembly Line, 25.1 FRONTIERS
A JOURNAL OF WOMEN'S SNDIES 59,60 (2004).

I'

Intolerable Killings, supra note 6, at 22.

- Are NAFTA and

-

the U.S.-Mexico border increased dramatically following its passage.'5 NAFTA helped to create
1.2 million jobs in Mexico, over one quarter of which are located in Ciudad ~u6rez.l~

Expansion in the number of factories located along the U.S.-Mexico border has led to a
population increase in those areas." Maquiladora workers typically come from small towns and
rural parts of ~ e x i c o . " While the maquiladora industry profits from paying its employees
lower wages than those paid in more developed countries, the maquiladoras offer comparatively
higher wages than elsewhere in Mexico and thus draw many people from other parts of the
country.19 In addition to economic need, young women seek employment with the maquiladoras
in order to achieve independent social lives.20 Thus, the migration of women to work in the
maquiladoras has created "a new phenomenon of mobile, independent

- and

vulnerable -

working women living in the city.'" Young women seeking work in the maquiladoras continue
to arrive in Ciudad J u k z at a rate of forty to sixty thousand per yea22
While employment with the maquiladoras presents economic opportunities for young
women in Mexico, it also carries with it substantial risk. The perpetrators of the murders that
have taken place in Ciudad J&ez since 1993 have abducted many of their victims while the

l5

Vega, supra note 12, at 144.

l6

Livingston, supra note 13, at 60.

l7

Spencer, supra note 1, at 509.
Livingston, supra note 13, at 60.

l9

Intolerable Killings, supra note 6, at 23.
Livingston, supra note 13, at 61.
Id. at 60 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

22

Id. at 61.

victims were on their way to and from work at the maquiladoras?' This pattern of abduction is
not surprising given that many of the women working in the maquiladoras cannot afford secure
transportation to and from work."

These women walk through unlit dirt roads each day,

sometimes alone, often leaving early in the morning in order to account for the longer travel
time?'
Furthermore, although it is difficult to characterize the motivation behind these crimes
with much specificity, "there is general agreement among both the state and non-state sectors
that most [of the crimes] relate to manifestations of violence with gender specific causes and

consequence^."^^ Amnesty International has stated that the suffering of the victims "indicates a
form of violence based entirely on their domination and humiliation as young women."''

As

mentioned previously, many of the victims' bodies have shown evidence of sexual violence and
t o m e , including lacerations, amputation and biting of the breasts and/or genitals?s Some
women were discovered bound, "with panties wound around [their] knees and scarves or purse
strings tied around [their]

throat^."^

The pattern and nature of these killings leave little doubt

that the perpetrators are targeting the victims, at least in part, because they are women.
Several theories have been advanced to explain the mwders in greater detail. One such

theory is that the women working in the maquiladoras challenge traditional notions of

23

Spencer, supra note 1, at 5 10.

2'

Id. at 5 1 1; IACHR Report, supra note 2 , 7 90.

2'

Spencer, supra note 1, at 511.

26

IACHR Report, supra note 2.7 43.

27

Intolerable Killings, supra note 6, at 28.
Diebel, supra note 11.

29

Id.

womanhood in ~ e x i c o . ~According
'
to this theory, it may be that some Mexican men, who
traditionally occupy the role of breadwinner, feel threatened by the increasing economic
independence of these women?' Conversely, unemployment and low wages diminish the ability
of Mexican men to support their households, which likely challenges their perceptions of their
own masculinity?* In fact, labor shortages have led to increased numbers of males working in
the maquiladoras; it is estimated that men comprise 35 to 50 percent of the maquiladora work
force?3 Thus, misogyny expressed through violence could be a consequence of women's
challenge to the traditional role of men as economic providers in the context of a culture in
which men dominate women?4
However, given their frequency and nature, there is something unique about the murders
in Ciudad Juhrez. Although the theory of "gender backlash" has intuitive appeal, it does not
account for why the murders are taking place in Ciudad Juhez and not throughout Mexico,
where the aforementioned cultural factors are also presumably present. While the broader
context of Mexican social norms may explain the perpetrators' motivation to cany out the
violence, it does not explain who the perpetrators are or why they are concentrated in Ciudad
J u k . In other words, despite the pervasiveness of patriarchal social mores in Mexico, the
perpetrators of the violence represent an anomalous subset of the population that is motivated to
carry out the ultimate punishment against these women. Thus, the theory of gender backlash is

M

Livingston, supra note 13, at 67 (citing Susan Tiano and Carolina Ladino, Doting, Mating, and Motherhood:
AND PLANNING
A 305,307(1999)).
Identiry Construction Among Mexican Maquila Workers, 31 ENV~RONMMT

" I d . at 69.
32 Id.

limited in that it cannot account for the differences between the perpetrators and other members
of Mexican society who have not chosen to commit violence against women.
Nevertheless, the prevalence of domestic violence in Mexican society supports the notion
that some of the violence against women is traceable to societal norms. Several studies indicate
that one third to one half of Mexican women in relationships suffer some form of abuse by their
partners, especially women between the ages of 15 and 29 and pregnant women?'

Not

surprisingly, Ciudad Juhrez currently has the highest rate of domestic violence in ~ e x i c o ? ~
Furthermore, it was not until the year 2000 that the State of Chihuahua even made domestic
violence a criminal offence?'

Finally, in addition to the murders of the young workingwomen

by presumably unknown assailants, a substantial number of the killings in Ciudad J k e z since
1993 have taken place in the domestic and intrafamilial context?* Thus, it can certainly be said

that, although precise causal explanations remain elusive, the violence against the women in
Ciudad J u h z is taking place in a broader context of gender-related violence in Ciudad Juiira
and Mexico in general.

-

35 IACHR Repolt, supra note 2 , 7 59.

Livingston, supra note 13, at 71.

'' Intolerable Killings, supra note 6, at 8.
''IACHR Report, supra note 2,7 57.

Section 2: Legal Protections under Domestic and International Law
The murders of the women in Ciudad JuArez have gained international attention.39
However, the vast majority of the murders remain unsolved and the investigation by Mexican
authorities has been inadequate; only 20 percent of the killings had resulted in prosecutions and
convictions as of March 2003.~' Among the aspects of the inadequate response by Mexican
authorities are: (1) delay in the initiation of investigations; (2) insufficient effort once
investigation has commenced, (3) mishandling of evidence; (4) mistreatment of family members
of victims; (5) lack of technical and scientific capability of the police; and (6) failure to gather
evidence regarding sexual violence?' Additionally, some Mexican officials and human rights
organizations have raised serious concerns regarding allegations of the use of torture to coerce
confessions from suspects?' Such allegations raise further doubts about the ability of Mexican
law enforcement to bring the actual perpetrators to justice.
Moreover, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) has received
reports of threats against human rights defenders, family members of the victims, and journalists
reporting on the crimes.43 For example, family members of victims have informed the IACHR
that they were watched or followed, that they received anonymous, intimidating phone calls
warning them to stop pursuing accountability for the murders, and that they did not report the

39

Spencer, supra note 1, at 513.

40

Id. at514;IACHRReport,~upranote2,fl4,81,135.

4'

IACHR Report, supra note 2, W 70-72.

" Id.,

*'

7 49; Intolerable Killings, supra note 6, at 51.

IACHR Report,supra note 2,7 65.

intimidation to the local authorities out of fear and lack of confidence in the authorities'
response.44
No official has been held accountable for the deficiencies in the Mexican government's
response to the killings?'

Mexico's National Human Rights Commission issued

recommendations in 1998 that addressed some of these deficiencies, yet none of the
recommendations had been implemented as of 2003.4~

Domestic Law

Recent amendments to the state and federal laws of Mexico appear to provide increased
protection for women's rights. For example, Article 1 of the Mexican Constitution was amended
in 2001 to prohibit all forms of discrimination, including discrimination based on gender.47 The
Constitution of Chihuahua incorporates all of the rights recognized in the federal constitution, as
well as those recognized in the international human rights treaties to which Mexico is a party?8
Furthermore, the Chihuahua Criminal Code has been amended to prohibit physical, verbal,
emotional or sexual violence against a family member.49
While these reforms represent positive advances in legal protections for women, it
remains to be seen whether government bodies and Mexican society at large will internalize the
principles underlying these reforms. For example, the Chihuahua legislature attempted to pass a
'4

IACHR Reporf supra note 2,

45

Id.,

65,147.

5, 142.

ld.,734.
" Constihci611PoUtica

de 10s Estados Unidos Mexicanos [Const.], as amended, art. 1, Diario Oficial de la
Federaci6n [D.O.], 5 de Febrero de 1917 (Mex.).

" Constilucih Politica del Estado de Chihuahua [Const.], as amended, art. 4,17 Junio de 1950 (Chihuahua, Mex.).
49

C6digo Penal del Estado de Chihuahua [Chihuahua Criminal Code], as amended, art. 190,4 de Mano de 1987.

law that would have allowed defendants in rape cases to offer evidence regarding whether the
victim "provoked" the attack, which would reduce the defendant's minimum sentence from four
years to one year.50 Although the law did not pass, the fact that such a law was even debated in
the legislature suggests such principles have not fully taken hold.
While the State of Chihuahua has criminal jurisdiction over the many instances of
violence against women that have taken place since 1993, the federal government has a
responsibility to apply its resources as well." The federal authorities did not participate in the
investigations of the Jdrez murders for several years on the grounds that such crimes did not fall
under federal jurisdiction, although in recent years the Procuraduria General de la Reptiblica
(PGR) (Office of the Attorney General) has cited evidence of federal offenses, such as organ
trafficking and pornography, in connection with the killings in order to claim jurisdiction.

"

The Mexican Cornisibn Nacional de Derechos Humanos (CNDH) (National Human
Rights Commission) published a report in 1998 following its investigation of 81 cases of

murdered women in the state of Chih~ahua.~~
The CNDH concluded in its report that state and
municipal authorities in Chihuahua were guilty of negligence and dereliction of duty in
connection with the investigations and prosecutions - or lack thereof - of the murders.54 The

" Livingston, supra note 13, at 66.
IACHR Report, supra note 2, fl140-41.
52

Intolerable Killings, supra note 6.

" See Comisi6n Nacional de Derechos Humanos, Recomendaci6n 044198 (available at httpJIwww.cndh.org.mx/
recomen/1998/044.htm)(last accessed Mar. 27,2006) (CNDHReport).

" Id., 5 40').

report called for criminal and administrative investigations of a variety of officials charged with
coordinating and carrying out investigations of the murders.55
State and municipal authorities rejected the recommendations, accusing the CNDH of
trying to damage the public image of the ruling party in Chihuahua, the Partido Accibn Nacional
( P A N ) , during an election year.56 However, the victorious Partido Revolucionario Inrtitucional

(PRI) administration also failed to implement the recommendations on the justification that the
recommendations referred only to the previous government.57 Thus, while the abduction and
murders of the women in Ciudad JuArez were central issues in the state election campaign that
year, resort to the political process failed to provide an adequate remedy for the victims and their
families?'
The ineptitude of the judicial and political processes in Mexico led victims and human
rights groups to file complaints with international human rights governing bodies.59 These
organizations

--

and the international community in general

--

have responded with sharp

criticism of the Mexican government, have increased awareness regarding the violence, and have
engaged the Mexican government in dialogue regarding how it might begin to deal with this
problem effectively. Unfortunately, these measures are limited in terms of providing actual
protection for those have been or are becoming victims of the ongoing violence; it is ultimately
Mexico's responsibility to prevent and punish the violence that is taking place on its soil.60

55

Id., 0 5 .

56

Intolerable Killings, supra note 6, at 35.

57

Id.

58

Id. at 48.

59

IACHR Report, supra note 2,7 2.

" Id.,'fi 104.

International Conventions
The inability of state and federal authorities in Mexico to adequately address the violence
against women means that Mexico is in violation of international human rights covenants to
which it is a party!1

Pursuant to its obligations under international law, Mexico is required to

investigate, prosecute and punish crimes of violence against women6*

The Universal

Declaration of Human Rights (Universal ~eclaration);~the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR),~~
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights

(ICESCR),~~
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
(CEDAW),~~
the American Convention on Human Rights (American

onv vent ion)^' and the

Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of Violence against
Women (Convention of B e l h do

are among the relevant international human rights

instruments to which Mexico is a party.69

'' Intolerable K i l l i i , supra note 6, at 13.
IACHR ~eport,
supra note 2 , 9.~

" Universal Declaration of Human Rights,Dec. 10,1948, G. A. Res. 217A (III), U . N. Doc. N810.
6*

International Covenant on Civil and Politioal Rights,Dec. 19,1996,999 U.N.T.S. 171.

'' International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 19,1966,993 U.N.T.S. 3 , 6 I.L.M. 360.
66

Convention on the E l i i t i o n of All Fonns of Discrimination against Women, Jul. 17, 1980, G.A. Res. 341180,
U.N. GAOR, 34th Seas., Supp. No. 46, U.N. Doc. N34/46,19 I.L.M. 33.

67

American Convention on Human Rights,Nov. 22,1969,1144 U.N.T.S. 123,9 I.L.M. 673.

" Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of Violence against Women, 33
I.L.M. 1534 (m force Mar. 5,1995).
69

IACHR ~ e p o asupra
,
note 2,n 9.

The Universal Declaration, the ICCPR and the ICESCR each broadly recognize women's
right to equality and the prohibition of di~crimination.~~
The CEDAW requires signatory states
to adopt specific measures to combat discrimination against women?' In order to give effect to
its guarantees, the American Convention also requires signatory states to adopt legislative and
other measures to implement the guarantees in practice."

The Convention of B e l h do Par5

requires signatory states to prevent, investigate and punish gender-based vi0lence.7~
Additionally, the American Convention obliges signatory states to provide effective judicial
recourse for anyone alleging violations of her or his rights under domestic law or under the
American Convention

Where such recourse is unavailable or ineffective, the inter-

American system provides an avenue for recourse through its individual petition system?'
Furthermore, Mexico is obliged under the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (cRc)~~to
locate these missing women, given that a large number of them are min0rs.7~These international
human rights instruments underscore Mexico's obligation to investigate and prosecute genderbased violence, even when the perpetrators of such violence are non-state agents?'

70

Universal Declaration, supra note 63, arts. 1 & 2; ICCPR, supra note 64, arts. 2 62 3; ICESCR, supra note 65, arts.
2 &3.

71

CEDAW, supra note 66, art. 2.

* American Convention, supra note 67, rat. 2.
73

Convention of BeMm do Par& supra note 68, art. 7.

74

American Convention, supra note 67, art 25.

75

IACHR Report, supra note 2 , 102.
~

76

Conventio~lon the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20,1989,1577 U.N.T.S.3,28 I.L.M. 1448.

77

Intolerable Killings, supra note 6, at 33; IACHR Report, supra note 2, 121.

78

Intolerable Killings, supra note 6, at 65.

Furthermore, Mexico's human rights obligations apply equally to violence that takes
place in both the "public" and "private" spheres. The Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights (IACHR) points out that %ere is an insufficient understanding [by Mexican authorities]
that these deaths, whether perpetrated

. . . by unknown perpetrators . . . or . . . by intimate

partners, are equally violative of the right to be fke from violence, and equally manifest the
objectification or dehumanization of the victim based on gender."79
The CNDH has found Mexico to be noncompliant with some of the aforementioned
instruments with respect to the situation in Ciudad ~utirez.'~Furthermore, although Mexico has
adopted some legislation that conforms to its obligations under these instruments, Mexico has
not properly enforced these laws."

The IACHR published a report in 2003 denouncing

Mexico's failure to prevent the violence and punish the perpetrators, which has raised awareness
but has done little to effect real change in Mexico's enforcement of its own laws. Furthermore,
the IACHR has received individual petitions from victims' families and advocates, yet there is
no indication that the IACHR has acted upon these petitions beyond preliminarily evaluating
The women of Ciudad Jukez therefore remain subject to ongoing gender-based
violence, despite the existence of domestic and international laws aimed at securing their
fundamental human rights. Because no effective recourse is available through Mexican and
international legal mechanisms, it is possible that women fleeing persecution in Ciudad Jutirez
could make a claim for asylum in the United States.

79

IACHR Report, supra note 2,7 123.

CNDH R q r t , supra note 53, Summary,7 5 (finding violations of articles 1 & 2 of the Convention of B e l h do
Par4 and articles 1 & 7 of the Universal Declaration).

'' UCHR Report,supra note 2,7 153.
Id., 7 26.

Section 3: Potential Avenues for Relief under United States Asylum Law
The purpose of asylum law is to protect potential or actual victims of persecution whose
states of origin are unable or unwilling to provide such protection?3 Asylum law in its modern
form originated as part of an international response to the tragedies of World War I1 that
displaced millions of people. Shortly after its own inception, the United Nations drafted the
1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951 ~onvention),8~
which set

forth internationally accepted principles of asylum law.85 The 1951 Convention was later
The United
amended by the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (1967 ~rotocol)?~
States did not sign the 1951 Convention, though it is a signatory of the 1967 ~rotocol.8~
The
1967 Protocol was incorporated into United States domestic law by the passage of the Refugee

Act of 1980 (Refugee ~ct),8' which amended the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952
(INA).'~

83

Karen Musalo, Jennifer Moore & Richard Boswell, REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY: A

COMPARATIVE AND

(Karen Musalo, Jennifer Moore & Richard Boswell eds., Carolina Academic Press
2d ed. 2002). The meaning of "persecution" in the context of asylum law is discussed more fully below.
INTERNATIONAL APPROACH 4

Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28,1951, 19 U.S.T. 6223,189 U.N.T.S. 150.
See Teresa L. Peters, Note, International Refugee Law and the Treatment of Gender-Based Persecution:
International Initiatives as a Model and Mandate for National Reform, 6 TRANSNAT'L
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
225,231 (1996).
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31,1967,19 U.S.T. 6223,606 U.N.T.S. 267. The 1967 Protowl
amended Article 1 of the 1951 Convention, which set forth the definition of a "refugee:' to eliminate certain
geographical and temporal restrictions on this definition.
"

1967 Protowl, supra note 86.

Pub. L. No. 96-212,94 Stat. 102 (1980).
89

66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified at 8 U.S.C.

$8 1101-1537).

In order to qualify for asylum in the United States, an applicant must prove that she is a
refugee as defined by the INA.~' The INA defines a refugee as:
[Alny person who is outside any country of such person's nationality, and who is
unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or
herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded
fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion?'
The INA definition is based upon the definition found in Article 1 of the 1951 Convention and
amended by the 1967 ~ r o t o c o land
, ~ ~sets forth three factors that the applicant must satisfy in
order to be eligible for asylum.
First, the applicant must have fled from her home country or country of last habitual
residence?' Second, the applicant must be unable or unwilling to return to the country in which
she fears persecution because she has already been persecuted (past persecution) or has a wellfounded fear of persecution (future persecution).94 Finally, the persecution that the applicant
fears must be based on one of five enumerated grounds: race, religion, nationality, membership
in a particular social group, or political opinion?'

INA 5 208(b)(l)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. 5 1158(b)(l)(B)(i) ('The burden of proof is on the applicant to establish that the
applicant is a refugee, within the meaning of [INA] section 101(a)(42)(A) [8 U.S.C. 5 1101(a)(42)(A)].").
91

92

INA g 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. $ 1101(a)(42)(A).

1951 Convention, supra note 84, art. 1(A)(2); 1967 Protocol, supra note 86, art. 1; Caryn L. Weisblat, Comment,
Gender-Based Persecution: Does United States Law Provide Women Refugees with a Fair Chance?, 7 TUL J .
INT'L~CCOMP.
L. 407,413 (1999).

" INA 5

208(a)(l), 8 U.S.C.

5

1158(a)(l); INA g 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C.

* INA 9

8 1101(a)(42)(A).

101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. 5 1101(a)(42)(A); INA 5 208(a)(l), 8 U.S.C. 9 1158(a)(l) (''Any alien who is
physically present in the United States or who anives in the United States . . . may apply for asylum in
accordance with this section . . ..'?.

95

INA 5 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. 8 1101(a)(42)(A).

The analysis presented in this paper presumes that the asylum claimant has fled to the
United States from Mexico, thus satisfying the first prong of the refugee definition. The paper
therefore focuses on the second and third factors, namely, the nature of the persecution from
which the asylum applicant is fleeing and the basis upon which the applicant alleges the
persecution is taking place.% The following section (Step One) presents how persecution is
analyzed under the INA and how the women from Ciudad J u k might fit into this analysis.
The section is broken down into two subcategories: (1) whether the applicant fears harm that
rises to the level of "persecution" for asylum purposes; and (2) whether the fear is "wellfounded," based on either past persecution or potential future persecution.

%

Although this paper is primarily concerned with the legal analysis of how persecuted women from Ciudad J u k z
might assert their asylum claims in the United States, it is worth mapping the basic administrative and judicial
hierarchy through which such claims must travel. Prior to the passage of the Homeland Security Act of 2002
WSA), Pub. L. No. 107-296,116 Stat. 2135 (2002), the Immigration and Natuahation Service (INS), an agency
of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), was responsible for adjudicating asylum claims. This responsibility is
now shared between the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Senices (BCIS) in the Department of Homeland
Security @HS), and the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), an agency within the DOJ. 8 C.F.R. 8
1.1 (2003); see also U.S. Department of Justice, Executive Office for Immigration Review, News Release,
Asylum Protection in the United Sues, 7 5 (April 28, 2005) (DOJ News Release), available at
h t t p : / / w w w . u s d o j . g o v / e o i r / p m s / O 5 / A s y l (last
~ accessed on March 14,2006).
For cases in which an asylum applicant is affirmatively seeking asylum ("a&nntiveve' claims), BCIS asylum
officers i n t e ~ e wthe applicant and determine whether to grant asylum. 8 C.F.R $ 208.14@) (2000). If the
asylum officer does not grant asylum, the officer refers the applicant's case to an EOIR immigration court. 8
C.F.R. 9 208.14@)(2) (2000). The asylum officer's determinations are not binding on the EOIR immigration
judge 0,who evaluates the applicant's claim de novo. DOJ News Release, 7 9. Asylum claims that are asserted
as a defense to removal ("defensive claims") begin in the EOIR immigration court, which has jurisdiction over
removal proceedings. INA 5 240(a)(l), 8 U.S.C. $ 1230(a)(l).
Decisions made by the U may be appealed to the Bureau of Immigration Appeals (BIA) within the DOJ, as was
the case prior to the passage of the HSA. 8 C.F.R. 5 1003.1@)(9) (2005). BIA decisions, which are binding on
the lower immigration courts, 8 C.F.R. 5 1003.l(g) (ZOOS), are final executive decisions and may be appealed
directly to the federal circuit court of appeals for the jurisdiction in which the case is taking place. 8 C.F.R 8
1003.l(d)(7) (2005); see also 8 C.F.R. 8 1003.l(h) (2005) (the Attorney General may review BIA decisions under
certain circumstances). Finally, federal circuit wurt decisions, which are themselves binding on the BIA and
lower immigration courts in the relevant circuits, are subject to review by the Supreme Court of the United States.
U.S. Const. art. 111,s 2.

Step One: Well-Founded Fear of Persecution
A. What is Persecution?

In making her claim for asylum, the applicant has the burden of proving that she fears
persecution in her home country?' Neither the 1951 Convention nor the Refugee Act defines
~ e r ~ e c u t i o n . "However,
~~
the BIA construed the meaning of "persecution" as "harm or
suffering [that] must be inflicted upon an individual in order to punish him for possessing a
belief or characteristic a persecutor seeks to overcome."99 The federal circuit courts of appeal
have generally accepted persecution in this context to mean "the infliction or suffering of harm
upon those who differ.

. .in a way regarded as offensi~e."'~~
The offensive treatment must be

"extreme" to qualify as persecution.'0' Some courts have expanded upon this definition, holding
that
[P]ersecution includes more than threats to life and fkeedom

. . . and therefore

includes a variety of forms of adverse treatment, including non-life-threatening
violence and physical abuse

. . . or non-physical forms of harm such as the

deliberate imposition of a substantial economic disadvantage[.]'02

98

99

Seegenerally 1951 Convention, supra note 84; Refugee Act, supra note 88; see also INA $ 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. 8
1101(a)(42); Li v. AG of the United States, 400 F.3d 157, 170 (3d Cir. 2005) ("Congress chose not to define
"persecution" in the Refugee Act, nor has any legislative definition been enacted in the interim.").
Matter ofAcosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 21 1,223 (BIA 1985),

'O1~orablinu
v. INS, 158 F.3d 1038,1044 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that the cumulative effect of several instances of
violence and harassment compel a findimg of pememtion); Tnmas-Mrcea v. Reno, 222 F.3d 417,424 (7th Cir.
2000) (holding that mere harassment is not pemecution).
'"lvanishvili v. US. Dept. of Justice, 433 F.3d 332, 341 (2d Ci. 2006) ( i i citations and quotation marks
omitted); see also Mashiri v. Ashcrof?, 383 F.3d 1112,1120 (9th Cir.2004) (holding that violence against family
members and emotional trauma may constitute persecution).

Furthermore, the courts may consider the cumulative harm an applicant has suffered, even if no
single incident considered in isolation would rise to the level of persecution.1"
Persecution under the INA includes persecution by a non-governmental group that the
foreign government is "unwilling or unable to control."104For example, the failure of police to
respond in a meaningful way to an applicant's reports of persecution by a non-state actor can
form the basis for a valid asylum claim.'05 Whether a government is "unable or unwilling to
control" private actors is a factual question that the immigration courts resolve on a case-by-case
basis.Io6
Violence and oppressive acts against women are kinds of persecution that may form the
basis for a valid asylum claim.Io7 The international community has accepted that sexual violence
committed for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or

hand v. INS,222 F.3d

1066, 1074 (9th Cir. 2000).

'M~atalova
v. Ashcrofl, 355 F.3d 1246, 1253 (10th Cir. 2004) (quotation omitted); Korablina, 158 F.3d at 1044
("Discrimination, harassment, and violence by groups that the government is unwilling or unable to conaol can. .
. constitute persecution!') (internal citation omitted); see also UNHCR Guidelines on International Protection:
Gender-Related Persecution within the wntext of Article lA(2) of the 1951 Convention andlor its 1967 Protocol
relating to the Status of Refugees (UNHCR Guidelines on International Protection), U.N. Doc. HCR/GIP/02/01,
15 (2002) ("If the State . . . does not accord certain rights or protection from serious abuse, then the
discrimination in extending protection, which results in serious harm inflicted with impunity, wuld amount to
persecution.").
10'~nre 0 - Z - and I-Z, 22 I . & N. Dec. 23,26 (BIA 1998) (upholding a grant of asylum where "the respondent
reported at least three . . . incidents to the police, who took no action beyond writing a report."); but cf:Hasalla v.
Ashcrofr, 367 F.3d 799, 804 (8th Cir. 2004) (The fact that police did not take action on anonymous threats "does
not necessarily mean that the . . . govenunent was unable or unwilling to control the individuals who made the
threats.").
'"~enjivarv. Gonzales,416 F.3d 918,921 (8th Cir. 2005).

lW~manda
Blanck, Note, Domestic Violence as a Basisfor Asylum Sfaha: A Human Rights Based Approach, 22
WOMEN'SRIGHTS L. REP. 47,59 (2000).

political opinion may be considered persecution for asylum purposes if governmental authorities
knowingly tolerate such violence or are unable to offer effective protection fiom it.''
The federal circuit courts of the United States have also recognized that gender-based
violence and sexual violence may constitute persecution. For example, the BIA has held that
female genital mutilation (FGM) is a form of

Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has

held that sexual assault, including forced oral sex, may amount to persecution."0 The BIA has
also found that persecution can include beatings, rape and threats.'"

Thus, physical and

psychological harm alike may be persecution in the context of gender-based asylum claims.
Domestic violence is another example of gender-based persecution.

In Aguirre-

Cervantes v. 1 7 ~ ~the
, ' 'Ninth
~
Circuit granted asylum to a Mexican woman who was abused by

her father. The court supported its holding by pointing to evidence the applicant produced that

' 0 8 ~ l a n ~supra
k , note 107, at 66; UNHCR Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee Women (UNHCR Guidelines),
U.N. Doc. EC/SCP/67, 7 59 (1991); UNHCR Guidelines on International Protection, supra note 104, 7 3
("Gender-related claims have typically encompassed, although are by no means limited to, acts of sexual
violence, familyldomestic violence, coerced family planning, female genital mutilation, punishment for
transgression of social mores, and discrimination against homosexuals.").

lWln re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 358 (BIA 1996); see also Mohamed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785 (9th Cir.
2005) ('W
' le
have no doubt that the range of procedures wllectively known as female genital mutilation rises to
the level of persecution within the meaning of our asylum law.").
l l o ~ e r n a n d ~ ~ o nv.t NS,
i e l 225 F.3d 1084, 1097 (9th Cir. 2000). overruled in part on othergrounds by Thomas v.
Gonzales, 409 F.3d 1177,1187 (9th Cir. 2005); see also BoerSedano v. Gonzales,418 F.3d 1082, 1088 (9th Cir.
2005) (finding persecution where a police officer forced the applicant, a homosexual man, to perform oral sex on
him nine times).
"'ln re D V , 21 I . & N. Dec. 77 (BL4 1993); see also Navas v. INS,217 F.3d 646, 658 (9th Cir. 2000) (death
threats alone may constitute persecution); but see Sepulveda v. United States AG, 401 F.3d 1226, 1231 (1 lth Cir.
2005) (holding that menacing telephone calls and threats did not amount to persecution); Mitev v. Ih'S, 67 F.3d
1325, 1330-31 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that the question of whether a threat amounts to persecution depends on
the context in which the threat is made).
"'242 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2001), reh'ggranted,270 F.3d 794 (9th Ci. 2001), vacatedperstipulation and remanded
to BU,273 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 2001).

demonstrated the pervasiveness of domestic violence in ~exico.'" The court also found that the
Mexican government was unable or unwilling to control the woman's father.."4 Although this
panel decision is not binding precedent (the decision was vacated and remanded to the BIA
pursuant to the parties' ~ti~ulation"~
after AguimCervantes' father was murdered), the decision
is instructive in that it demonstrates how the pervasiveness of domestic violence in Mexico and
the Mexican government's failure to control it can form part of the basis for a grant of asylum.
The reasoning in Aguirre-Cewantes is mirrored in Matter of Maria

?".,Ii6

an immigration

judge (U)decision involving a woman fleeing her abusive husband in Mexico. The U in Maria

T. held that ''there is no doubt that [the applicant] suffered fiom . . . persecution in the form of
repeated beatings, emotional and verbal abuse, and death threats against her and her family over
a number of years.""7

The IJ also found that societal attitudes and the "unwillingness of

Mexican authorities to control persecutors in situations involving domestic violence" supported
the applicant's claim that she had a well-founded fear of persecution.'18
In light of the abovecited authority, the various types of violence committed against
women in Ciudad J h e z qualify as persecution under U.S.asylum law. First, there can be no
question that certain women in Ciudad Juirez have suffered h m extremely harmful acts,
including disappearance, sexual violence, torture and murder.

The Comisibn Nacional de

"'ld. at 1178 (citing evidence that, in Mexico, "the most pervasive violations of women's rights involve domestic
and sexual violence which is believed to be wide-spread and vastly under reported.") (internal quotation mks
omitted).
I14

Id. at 1178-79 (citing evidence that "domestic violence is widely condoned in Mexico and
authorities are unwilling to intervene in such matters.").

. . . law enfacement

1 1 5 ~ g u i r r e - ~ e ~ av.nINS,
t e s 273 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 2001).
' 1 6 ~ oA76665
.
(Immigr. Ct., SanFrancisco, Ca., Dec. 19,2002).
117

Id. at 3; see also Matter of --,No. A7691 1 (Immigr. Ct., San Antonio, Tx., May 6, 2002) (finding that the
applicant's husband persecuted her in the form of physical, sexual and emotional abuse).

118

Maria T.,at 7.
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Derechos Humanos (CNDH), the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR),
Amnesty International and the U.S.Department of State have concluded that Mexican authorities
have failed to prevent, prosecute and punish these acts.'I9 This failure means that the Mexican
government is unable or unwilling to control those responsible for violating the human rights of
these women.'20 Second, an applicant who has not been physically harmed but has received
threats or other indicia of imminent violence may be found to have suffered persecution.'21
While the nature of the violence committed against women in Ciudad Juhrez lends itself
to a finding of persecution under the INA, the applicant must still demonstrate whether she has
suffered persecution in the past or reasonably fears suffering persecution in the future.Iz2

B. Past Persecution
In order to be eligible for asylum on the basis of past persecution, the applicant must
establish that she has "suffered persecution in the past in Fer] country of nationality

..

An

applicant who establishes that she has suffered past persecution is presumed to have a wellfounded fear of future persecution.124

119

CNDH Report, supra note 53, 8 4(j); IACHR Report, supra note 2, fl4, 5; Intolerable Killings, supra note 6, at
13; See also Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights & Labor, U.S. State Department, 2005 Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices Mexico (Mar. 8, 2006), at http://www.state.gov/g/drl~t~2006/62736.htm,8 5
0 s Country Report) (last visited Mar. 15, 2005) (citing reports that "impunity for sexual violence against
women in the country was extensive and. ..perpetrators of such crimes rarely were brought to justice.").

-

"'8 C.F.R 8 1208.13@)(2003) (An asylum applicant "may qualify as a refugee either because . . .she has SUM
past persecution or because. . . she has a well-founded fear of future persecution!').

I U ~ e s iv.
r nchert, 840 F.2d 723,729 (9th Cir. 1988); 8 C.F.R. 8 1208.13@)(1).

There are a variety of ways that women from Ciudad J u h x could show that they have
suffered past persecution. For example, an applicant could present evidence regarding stalking
or threats that she has received that lead her to reasonably fear that she will soon be among the
hundreds of women who have suffered fkom sexual violence and murder in Ciudad Ju6re.z.
Additionally, women affected by domestic violence in Ciudad J u k z can present evidence of
beatings, sexual violence and other harms that rise to the level of persecution.
One problem, however, is that many of the women in Ciudad J u k z do not live to tell
about the persecution they have suffered. Thus, women who fear persecution in Ciudad Ju6rez

are caught between not having enough evidence of persecution and having too much. Certainly a
woman who has survived domestic violence, sexual assault, kidnapping, rape or attempted
murder will be likely to establish that she has suffered past persecution under the INA.
Assuming the applicant is able to establish that she has suffered past persecution, the
inquiry does not end there. Although a showing of past persecution creates a presumption of a
well-founded fear of persg~tion,'25DHS can overcome the presumption by showing that either:
(1) there has been a fundamental change in circumstances such that the applicant no longer has a

well-founded fear of persecution;'26 or (2) the applicant could avoid future threats by relocating
within the country, assuming that it would be reasonable under all the circumstances to do ~ 0 . ' ~ '
Because the situation in Ciudad Jukez shows no sign of changing in the near future,'28

DHS is unlikely to be able to show a fundamental change in circumstances to overcome a
12'8 C.F.R. 5 208.13&)(1).
126

8 C.F.R. 5 208.13(b)(l)(i)(A); see also Galina v. INS, 213 F.3d 955 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that vague assertions

in a Department of State country report are insufficient to show a fundamental change in circumstances).

In8 C.F.R $208.16@)(l)(i)(B).
128

DOS Country Report, supra note 119,n 2 (''Violence against women continue[s] to be a problem nationwide,
particularly in Ciudad J w e z and the surrounding area.").

23

presumption of future persecution.129 DHS may have more success, however, if it argues that
women fleeing Ciudad JuSrez should relocate within Mexico to avoid persecution. In order to
successfully overcome the presumption of future persecution, DHS must show that relocation is

(1) possible and (2) reasonable under the

circumstance^."^

DHS can demonstrate whether

relocation is possible by showing that the persewtion from which the applicant is fleeing does
not exist throughout the country.13' Given that the 2005 DOS Country Report for Mexico states
that "[v]iolence against women continue[s] to be a problem

nation wide[,^'" DHS may have

difficulty establishing that relocation is possible.
However, assuming DHS is able make this showing, it must next prove that relocation is
rea~onab1e.l~~
In determining the reasonableness of relocation, asylum adjudicators may
consider, but are not limited to considering: "whether the applicant would fhce other serious
harm in the place of suggested relocation; any ongoing civil strife within the country;
administrative, economic or judicial infrastructure; geographical limitations; and social and
cultural constraints, such as age, gender, health, and social anQ familial ties."134 The

lZ9seeBoer-Sedano, 418 F.3d at 1089 (holding that INS failed to rebut presumption of future pasemtion against a
Mexican homosexual applicant because Department of State country reports for Mexiw indicated that
"persecution similar to that experienced by the petitioner still exists [in Mexico].").
lM8 C.F.R. 1208.13@)(3); see also Mohamed v. Ashcrofl, 396 F.3d 999, 1006 (8th Ci.2005) ("Relocation must
not only be possible, it must also be reasonable."); Gambmhidze v. Ashcroj?, 381 F.3d 187, 189 (3d Cir. 2004)
(''The regulation envisions a two-part inquiry: whether relocation would be a successful means of escaping
persecution, and whether relocation would be reasonable.") (emphasis in original).
'3'~elkonianv. Ashcroj?, 320 F.3d 1061, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003) ("[Blecause a presumption of well-founded fear
arises upon a showing of past persecution, the burden is on the INS to demonstrate by a prepondemce of the
evidence, once such a showing is made, that the applicant can reasonably relocate internally to an area of
safety.").
'

3

2

Country
~ ~
Report, supra note 119,n 2.

13'8 C.F.R.

5 1208.13@)(3).

1348C.F.R 5 1208.13@)(3); see d s o Melkonian, 320 F.3d at 1071 (familial ties are a factor to be considered in the
reasonableness analysis); Knezevic v. Ashcrofl, 367 F.3d 1206, 1214 (9th Cir. 2004) (diiculty tinding
employment and having no means of support may be considered in the reasonableness analysis); In re T-M-B, 21

reasonableness analysis must be based on the totality of the ~ircumstances.'~~
The applicable
regulation notes that "these factors may or may not be relevant, depending on all the
circumstances of the case, and are not necessarily determinative of whether it would be
reasonable for the applicant to relocate."'36
Although there is evidence that gender-based violence exists throughout ~exico,"'
relocation to avoid persecution may be possible for some of the women of Ciudad Jh.
Nevertheless, even if DHS can establish relocation as a possibility, relocation may not
necessarily be reasonable. Depending on the circumstances of each case, relocation may not be
reasonable due to familial ties, lack of economic opportunity in Mexico, and lack of resources to
do so. Given that many women migrated to Ciudad Juhez from poorer areas of Mexico,
economic considerations may hold the most sway with the immigration judges.'38 However,
because each case presents a unique set of facts, any number of them could be determinative in
the reasonableness of relocation analysis.'39
If the applicant is able to prove past persecution, and if the government cannot carry its
burden of showing changed circumstances or an internal relocation alternative, the applicant
must next show that the persecution is taking place on account of her protected characteristic(s)

I. & N. Dec. 775, 789 (BIA 1997) (reasonableness determination includes consideration of Likely financial or
logistical barriers).
'35~arnbashidze,
381 F.3d at 192.
IM8C.F.R. $ 1208.13@)(3).
137

DOS Country Report, supra note 119, at 7 2.

supra note 1, at 509.
138~pencer,
1398C.F.R. $ 1208.13@)(3).

under the INA.'~' However, if the applicant fails to show that she has suffered past persecution,
she may still qualify as a refugee if she can establish her well-founded fear of future persecution.

C. Well-Founded Fear of Future Persecution
To make a claim based on a well-founded fear of future persecution, an applicant must
show "both a genuine, subjective fear of persecution, and an objective basis by credible, direct,
and specific evidence in the record, of facts that would support a reasonable fear of
persecution."141 Well-founded fear thus consists of both a subjective and an objective
component.'42
An applicant may satisfy the subjective prong by showing that events in the country from

which she is fleeing have personally or directly affected her.I4' The applicant can satisfy this
component if she credibly testifies that she genuinely fears persecution.'"

To fulfill the

objective component, the applicant must submit documentary evidence or testimony alleging
specific facts that lend support to her subjective fear.14' Applicants thus bear the burden of
meeting the objective component by demonstrating a well-founded fear of persecution through
"credible, direct, and specific evidence in the record."'46 A threat need not be statistically more

'*INA 8 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. 8 1101(a)(42)(A).
"I

Wiransane v. Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 889,893 (10th Cir. 2004) (quotation omitted).

" ' ~ e eMelendez v. United States Depf of Justice, 926 F.2d 21 1,215 (2d Cir.1991).
'"ld (The subjective component "may be based on the applicant's reaction to even& that impinge on [her]
personally.'').
l"~rasadv. hVS, 47 F.3d 336,338 (9th Cir. 1995); Singh v. INS, 134 F.3d 962,966 (9th Cir. 1998).
145~elendez,
926 F.2d at 215 ("[OJnce subjective fear is demonstrated, the applicant need only show that such fear
is grounded in reality to meet the objective element of the test."); Del Vaflev. INS, 776 F.2d 1407, 1411 (9th Cir.
1985) ("Jhcumentary evidence of past persecution or a threat of future persecution will usually suffice to meet
the 'objective wmponent' of the evidence requirement.").
lQ~isherv. M,
79 9.3d 955,960 (9th Cir.1996).

than fifty-percent likely to effect a well-founded fear; even a threat that is only ten percent likely
to take place could form the basis for a well-founded fear of persecution.147
The fact that threats against an applicant have yet to be carried out does not render her
fear unreasonable.14* Threats on one's life, within a context of political and social turmoil or
violence, have long been held sufficient to satisfy a petitioner's burden of showing an objective
basis for fear of persecution.149The relevant inquiry is whether the group making the threat "has
the will or the ability to carry it out."150 Furthermore, "[tlhe significance of a specific threat to
an individual's life or fieedom is not lessened by the fact that.
number of persons are threatened . . . [i]f anything

..the lives and fieedom of a large

. . .that fact may make the threat more serious

or credib~e."'~~
Moreover, an applicant need not prove that she will be singled out for persecution if she

can prove a pattern or practice of persecution of people similarly situated to her who are
members of a protected group.1S2 She must produce some evidence connecting her subjective

147

Lim v. INS, 224 F.3d 929,934-935 (9th Cir. 2000) ("mhe Supreme Court has suggested that even a one-tenth
possibility of persecution might effect a well-founded fear.") (citing INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,480 U.S.421,430
(1987)); Diallo v. INS,232 F.3d 279, 284 (2d Cir. 2000) ("An alien's fear may be well-founded even if there is a
slight, though discernible, chance of pememtiou").

'"~olanos-~ernandez
v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277, 1285 (9th Cir. 1985).

15'8 C.F.R. 8 1208.13@)(2)(iii)(A)-(B) (proof of particularized persecution to establish a well-founded fear not
required only where the applicant proves a pattern or practice of persecution of a protected group to which the
applicant belongs); Kotasz v. INS, 31 F.3d 847, 852 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding BIA erred in requiring gypsy
petitioners to prove they were singled out for persecution where there was evidence other gypsies were being
persecuted).

fear to her membership in one of the five enumerated ~ a t e ~ 0 r i e s UNHCR
. l ~ ~ reports and news
articles can serve as such evidence.'"

In the case of in re ~asin~a,'''the BIA held that a woman fleeing from a country that
would not protect her from the practice of FGM had a well-founded fear of persecution.''6 The
applicant in that case was a citizen of Togo whose tribe practices FGM on women once they turn
age

Although her father initially protected her from FGM, her aunt forced her into a

polygamous marriage following his death.''* Her aunt and husband then planned to force her to
undergo the tribal custom of FGM."~ Fearing imminent mutilation, she fled Togo and
eventually arrived in the United
In support of its decision to grant asylum, the BIA cited a lack of evidence that Togo had
made any. efforts to protect women from FGM.'~' The BIA held that, given her credible
testimony and the documentary evidence supporting her claim, the applicant had a well-founded

I

v.~Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478,483 (1992) (holding that, where an asylum applicant alleges -tion
on
account of political opinion, the applicant must show that he was persecuted because of that opinion); see also
Gao v. Gomles, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 5406 (holding that the applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution
on account of her membmhip in a social group comprised of Chinese women who were sold into marriage).
S

I

lYffiezevic, 367 F.3d at 1213.

'5521I. & N. Dec. 357 (BIA 1996).

fear of persecution because "a reasonable person in her circumstances would fear persecution
upon return to T O ~ O . " ' ~ ~
Similarly, in Gao v. ~ o n z a l e s , the
' ~ ~Second Circuit held that a woman fleeing forced
marriage and domestic abuse in China had a well-founded fear of persecution. The court cited
evidence that trafficking of women is widespread in China and that the Chinese government's
efforts to combat this problem have been ineffective.'" The court found that, as a member of a
social group consisting of women sold into marriage in an area where such marriages are
considered valid and enforceable, the applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution upon
return to
What are the circumstances that would support a claim of a well-founded fear of
persecution for the women of Ciudad Jdirez? The statistics and data cited above support the
notion that there is a climate of gender-based violence in Ciudad Jdirez, both in the public and
"private" contexts, that goes unpunished by the Mexican authorities. However, mere reference
to general social conditions in an applicant's country of origin will likely stretch the limits of the
'&pattern or practice" exception to the rule requiring the applicant to allege specific facts that
demonstrate that she may be singled out for persecution.'66 On the one hand, women fleeing

from domestic violence

-- in Ciudad Jdirez or anywhere else in Mexico -- will likely be able to

testify to specific acts of their abusers that, if not amounting to past persecution, may
nevertheless form the basis of a well-founded fear of future persecution. Yet, on the other hand,
162

Id. at 366 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

lS32006U.S.App. L W S 5406 (2d Cir. 2006).
IMId.at *24.
at *2 1.
16S~d.

'&.See 8 C.F.R 9 1208,13(b)(2)(iii)(A)-(B); Kotasz, 31 F.3d at 852.
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women who fear persecution in the public sphere of Ciudad Juiirez may have more difficulty
establishing the reasonableness of that fear absent some other indicia that they may face
persecution.
For example, in both Kasinga and Gao, the applicants had some notice of impending
persecution: Kasinga knew that her aunt and husband wanted her to undergo FGM; Gao knew
that her husband had "purchased" her and intended to treat her as if she were his property. In
contrast, the women who have been persecuted in Ciudad Juirez in the "public" sphere have
probably never had much notice of the impending violence such that they wuld have fled to the
United States and asserted their well-founded fear. A great number of those women were
abducted prior to being beaten, raped, tortured and murdered.'67 It therefore seems that women
fleeing the public violence in Ciudad Juhez would have difficulty establishing a well-founded
fear of persecution without presenting some further evidence of an increased risk of persecution
that separates them h m other women in the area.'68

In contrast, women fleeing domestic violence should have less trouble presenting
objective evidence of imminent persecution. A victim of domestic violence will usually know
her abuser and the acts of which he is capable; such knowledge provides the victim with notice
of future harm and an opportunity to flee before it is too late. In either case, however, the
climate of gender-based violence taking place with impunity in Ciudad J k e z will bolster
women's claims of a well-founded fear of persecution.

167~pencer,
supra note 1, at 510.
lmGao,2006 U.S.App. LEXIS 5406 at *19-20.

Once an applicant has established a well-founded fear of persecution, she is still subject
to an internal relocation inquiry.'69 If she establishes her well-founded fear of persecution by a
non-state actor, and if she has not established past persecution, then she bears the burden of
establishing that it would be unreasonable for her to relocate to escape persecution.'70 In other
words, the burden of proof in the relocation analysis shifts fiom DHS to the applicant where the
applicant has not established past persecution and where the feared persecution is not by a
government or government-sponsored.17LThis would likely be the case for a woman fleeing

from Ciudad Jukez who has not suffered fiom past persecution; the violence from which she
flees is mostly likely at the hands of a non-state actor. She would therefore have to show why
relocation would be impossible and/or unreasonable. The reasonableness analysis is the same as
described above for applicants who have established past persecution.'72
Assuming the applicant has established her well-founded fear of persecution, she must
next demonstrate that the persecution she fears is on account of her possession of characteristics
that are protected under the INA.'"
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8 C.F.R 5 1208.13@)(2)(ii) ("An applicant does not have a well-founded fear of persecution if the applicant
could avoid persecution by relocating to another part of the applicant's country of nationality . . . if under all the
circumstances it would be reasonable to expect the applicant to do so."); Arboleda v. United States AG, 434 F.3d
1220, 1223 (11th Cir. 2006) ("[Ilt is not unreasonable to require a refugee who has an internal resettlement
alternative in his own country to
establish that such an option is unavailable!') (internal citation and quotation
omitted)..

.. .

'"8 C.F.R 5 1208.13(b)(3)(i) ("In cases in which the applicant has not established past persecution, the applicant
shall bear the burden of establishing that it would not be reasonable for him or her to relocate, unless the
persecution is by a government or is government-sponsored!'); Vente v. Gonzales, 415 F.3d 296, 303 (3d Cir.
2005) (holding that the applicant's burden was limited to demonstrating the present unreasonableness of internal
resettlement).
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8 C.F.R 5 1208.13@)(3)(i)("In cases in which the applicant has not established past persecution, the applicant
shall bear the burden of establishing that it would not be reasonable for him or her to relocate, unless the
persecution is by a government or is government-sponsored.").

ln8 C.F.R

5 1208.13@)(2)(ii); Mohamed, 396 F.3d at 1006; Gambashidze,381 F.3d at 189.

8 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. 5 1101(a)(42)(A).

Step Two: Protected Category and Nexus

In order to be eligible for asylum under the INA, the persecution from which the
applicant is fleeing must be "on account of" the applicant's race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.'"

This connection between the

feared persecution and characteristics of the applicant is often referred to as the "nexus"
requirement. The United States Supreme Court has held that applicants for asylum must provide
evidence connecting their persecutor's intent to one of the protected categories.'75 However, the
persecutor's illicit motive need not be the sole cause of the persecution.176
Nevertheless, the INA "makes motive critical," and the applicant "must provide some
evidence of [motive], direct or circumstantial."'"

In some cases, "the factual circumstances

alone may provide sufficient reason to conclude that acts of persecution were committed on
account o f .

. .protected

Thus, regardless of the severity of h a m from which the

asylum applicant is fleeing, she is not eligible for asylum unless such harm is based on one of the
five enumerated g r 0 ~ n d s . l ~ ~

'75~lias-Zaca?iiar,502 U.S.at 483.
176~ee~uRwago
v. Ashcroj?, 329 F.3d 157,170 (3d Cir. 2003) ("A pcrsccutor may have multiple motivations for his
or her conduct, but the persecutor must be motivated, at least in part, by one of the enumerated grounds!') (citing
Chang v. INS, 119 F.3d 1055, 1065 (3d Cir. 1997)); Boqa v. INS, 175 F.3d 732,735 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc)
(holding that applicants for asylum are not required to prove persecution "solely" on account of protected status);
Osorio v. INS, 18 F.3d 1017, 1028 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding that "persecution on account of' does not mean
"persecution solely on account of'); see at30 Ginna v. INS, 283 F.3d 664, 667-68 (5th Cir. 2000) (per curiam)
(following Boja and Osorio and applying a "mixed motive analysis").
' n ~ l i a s - ~ a r i a502
s , U.S.at 483.

'n~lanck,supra note 107, at 56.

While the factors set forth in the INA's refugee definition cover a wide range of factual
scenarios, gender is conspicuously absent from the list.Is0 The absence of gender from the INA
definition makes it extremely difficult for women to assert successful asylum c~aims.'~'Because
no gender category is available, this paper focuses on the "particular social group" category as an
avenue for the women of Ciudad Juhrez to articulate an asylum claim under the INA."~
A. Particular Social Group

The phrase "particular social group" has been defined to encompass a group of people
who are "united by a voluntary association, including a former association, or by an innate
characteristic that is so fundamental to the identities or consciences of its members that members
either cannot or should not be required to change it."Is3 The applicant must establish that her
particular social group exists independently of the persecution she has suffered or reasonably
fears.'"

In Matter ofAcosta, the BIA defined a "particular social group" as:

. . . a group of persons all of whom share a common, immutable characteristic.
The shared characteristic might be an innate one such as sex, color, or kinship
ties, or in some circumstances it might be a shared past experience such as former
military leadership or land ownership. The particular kind of group characteristic
l s o ~ l a n csupra
k
note 107, at 56.
lS1UNHCRGuidelines, supra note 108,n 54; but see UNHCR Guidelines on International Protection, supra note
104,116 ('The refugee definition,properly interprefed . covers gender-related claims.") (emphasis added).

..

l S 2 ~ hwomen
e
of Ciudad J u h z may also be able to frame their asylum claims using some of the other enumerated
categories (e.g. political opinion and religion), though I do not analyze such claims here.
' s 3 ~ e r n a n d aont ti el, 225 F.3d at 1093 (emphasis in original).
184~ukwago,
329 F.3d at 172; Rreshpja v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d 551, 556 (6th Ci.2005) ("[A] social group may not
be circularly defined by the fact that it suffers persecution. The individuals in the group must share a narrowing
characteristic other than their risk of being persecuted."); but see UNHCR Guidelines on International Protection,
supra note 104, at 7 31 ("[D]iscrimination or persecution may be a relevant factor in determining the visibility of
the group in a particulx context.").

that will qualify under this construction remains to be determined on a case-bycase basis. However, whatever the common characteristic that defines the group,
it must be one that the members of the group either cannot change, or should not
be required to change because it is fundamental to their individual identities or

conscience^.'^^
Most of the federal circuit courts have adopted this definition in some form.lS6 However, some

courts have adopted the Acosta standard while relaxing its emphasis on the term "immutable

character is ti^."'^^

For example, the Seventh Circuit has held that "education, manner of speech,

orprofession may be more mutable [characteristics] than one's race, ethnicity, or religion, but
these traits are nevertheless distinguishing markers within a given society that are not easily
changed or hidden."'88 This holding remains consistent with the Acosta standard in that, under
Acosta, the shared characteristic can be either a characteristic that the group members cannot

change, or one they should not be required to change -- even though they can

-- because the

characteristic is fimdamental to their individual id en ti tie^.'^^
To make a showing that she is a member of a particular social group, the applicant must
(1) specify the particular social group, (2) show that she is a member of that group, and (3) show

that she has a well-founded fear of persecution based on her membership in that group.'g0 The

l g 6 ~ a o2006
,
U.S. App. LEXIS 5406, at '13 (noting that federal courts of appeal have deferred to Acosta's
interpretation of "particular social group.")

win v. ZhS' ,

144 F.3d 505,512 (7th Cir. 1988).

188~rejuela
v. Gonurles, 423 F.3d 666,672 (7th Cir. 2005).
189~costa,
19 I. & N. Dec. at 233.

inquiry should focus on whether the feared danger affects the population in an undifferentiated

way, or if the danger exists on account of one of the five categories protected under the INA.19'
United States case law provides myriad examples of what may or may not constitute a
social group under the INA, though the precedential value of these cases is limited by their factspecific nature.I9'

For example, the Sixth Circuit has held that women who reasonably fear

FGM constitute a social

The Fourth Circuit has likewise held that family membership

~ Ninth Circuit held
may constitute membership in a particular social group under the I N A . ' ~The
that homosexual men in Mexico constitute a social group.195
In contrast, the Third Circuit held that abduction of children to become child soldiers was
not based on membership in social group of children, but on need for labor in military group;
violence was indiscriminate and affected all ci~i1ians.l~~
The Second Circuit, in a case involving
sexual violence against women, held that women who have been abused by Salvadoran guerillas
are not a social group because such women do not "possess common characteristics -- other than

gender and youth

--

such that would-be persecutors could identify them as members of the

I g 2 ~ a 2006
o , U.S. App. LEXIS 5406, at * l l
193

Abay v. Ashcrofl, 368 F.3d 634,638-40 (6th Cir.2004); see also Kasinga, 21 I . & N. Dec. 357.

' 9 1 . ~ o p ~ v.o Ashcrofl,
to
383 F.3d 228,235 (4th Cir.2004).
195

Boer-Sedano,418 F.3d at 1088; see also Hernandez-Montiel, 225 F.3d at 1094 (holding that gay men with female
sexual identities in Mexico comprise a particular social group); Karouni v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 1163, 1173 (9th
Cu.2005).

purported

In other words, the wurt held that the applicant failed to demonstrate that

she would be more likely than any other woman to be persecuted.L98
However, the Second Circuit recently clarified this holding in ~ a 0 . IAs
~ mentioned
~
above, Gao was a Chinese woman who had been sold into marriage with an abusive man.200
When she tried to break their engagement, he threatened her?''

In finding that Gao was a

member of a particular social group made up of ''women who have been sold into marriage . . .
and who live in a part of China where forced marriages are valid and enf~rceable[,l''~the wurt
limited its holding in Gomez to apply only to situations in which an applicant "fails to show a

risk of future persecution on the basis of the 'particular social group' claimed

...y3
The court

held that "the statutory term 'particular social group' is broad enough to encompass groups
whose main shared trait is a common one, such as gender, at least so long as the group shares a
further characteristic that is identifiable to would-be persecutors and is immutable or
fhdamental."~ The court therefore found that Gao set forth a stronger claim for a particular
social group than the one in Gomez because her proposed group shared identifiable
characteristics in addition to gender?05 The decision in Gao leaves open the possibility that an

'"Gornez v. A'.., 947 F.2d 660,664 (2d Cir. 1991).

'%Id.
lW2006U.S. App. LEXIS 5406.

M 3 ~at
d .'19-20 (emphasis in original).
r n ~ dat. *3.

asylum applicant could make a claim based on a broadly defined "particular social group" so
long as the applicant can establish that she faces a risk of future persecution based on her
membership in that group.
B. Applicable Social Groups in Ciudad Juhrez

The workingwomen and female students of Ciudad Juhrez should be considered members
of a particular social group for the purposes of U.S. asylum law. First, as women who are
challenging traditional notions of their role in Mexican society, they are more likely than other
women to be targets for violence. In a patriarchal society such as Mexico's, women who leave
their homes unaccompanied draw attention.'06 If such women take a similar route to work or
school each day, but cannot afford secure transportation, they become easy prey for those
seeking to harm them. While the characteristic of leaving the home for work may be "less
mutable" than race or nationality, the right to earn a living or to educate oneself is certainly
fundamental. Therefore, these women should not have to revert to more traditional roles in order
to avoid persecution.
Furthermore, the proposed social group is not defined by the persecution; female students
and blue-collar workingwomen in Ciudad Juhrez will continue to exist if and when the murders
and sexual violence cease. Finally, the social group comprised of working or studying women,
or simply women who are becoming economically independent in Ciudad J k z , meets the Gao
standard of a social group consisting of gender plus one or more other identifiable
characteristics. In other words, the proposed social group is narrower than a group simply
comprised of "Mexican women" or even "women from Ciudad Julira." The group would be
defined as working class women from Ciudad Juhrez who are asserting independence contrary to
Livingston, supra note 13, at 70.

the patriarchal norms of Mexican society. This assertion can take the form of seeking an
education, working for the maquiladoras or having some other form of financial independence.
Such a group would be consistent with the UNHCR Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee
Women, which instructs that women persecuted for violating social mores should be protected as
a social
However, as U.S. case law makes clear, a social group must be defined with some
precision in order to set outer limits on who may claim asylum. There are thousands of
workingwomen in Ciudad J u h z and other cities in Mexico. The U.S. government will likely be
concerned about the 'floodgate effect))) i.e., that any number of these women could simply claim
that they fear being the next in the string of murders in Ciudad Juhrez in order to gain access to
better economic opportunities in the United States.
Nevertheless, as mentioned previously, any woman who is seeking asylum in the United
States must still establish that she has suffered past persecution or has well-founded fear of
future persecution?08 This requirement should narrow the field of potential asylees because only
a limited number of women have suffered past persecution?09 Furthermore, as mentioned above,
many of these women do not survive the encounter with their persecutor and thus cannot assert a
claim for protection. The vast majority of women who fall somewhere in-between will likely
have to demonstrate, based on the circumstances of each individual case, that they are at an
increased risk of harm compared to the rest of the population of women in Ciudad JuArez.
Therefore, with regard to future persecution, an applicant will likely have to show something

2

w Guidelines,
~ supra note
~

108,T~54.

~

~

"MA g 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C.5 1101(a)(42)(A).
2 " ~ a r y e ~ eFullerton,
n
A Comparative Look at Refugee Status Based on Persecution Due to Membership in a
Particular Social Group,26 CORNELLINT'L L.J.505,561 (1993).

more than general country conditions in order to satisfy the objective prong; she may have to
prove specific facts, such as stalking, threats, or other indicia of impending violence.
Unfortunately, the numbers of women who are lucky enough to foresee an impending attack and
escape to safety are probably very low. Thus,as the likelihood of these women establishing their
well-founded fear of persecution is low, the "floodgate" concern would be misplaced with
respect to this particular social group.
C. Nexus

In addition to establishing that she is a member of a particular social group, the applicant
must then prove that the persecution she fears is on account of her membership in that group.
This "nexus" requirement has caused great difficulty for women asserting claims that are
essentially gender-based ~1airn.s.~'~
The difficulty stems from the pervasiveness of violence
against women worldwide, which may cause immigration judges

--

albeit, perhaps,

subconsciously -- to view such violence as "normal" or at least "unremarkable." Such views
may be at the heart of why gender was not enumerated in the 1951 Convention or the 1967
Protocol in the first place; perhaps the drafters of the 1951 Convention did not view genderbased persecution as unique or deserving enough to warrant a grant of refugee status.
Unfortunately, the failure to recognize gender as a protected category has meant that vast
numbers of women who have suffered persecution largely on account of their gender have not
had a remedy under asylum law.
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See, e.g., Matter of R-A-, 22 1. & N. Dec. 906 (BIA 1999) (denying asylum claim in part because the applicant
failed to pmve that her husband persecuted her on acwunt of a protected characteristic), remanded by Attorney
General, 23 I . &. N. Dec. 694 (AG 2005); see also UNHCR Guidelines, supra note 108,1] 54 ("The claim to
refugee status by women fearing harsh or inhumane treatment because of having transgressed their society's laws
or customs regarding the mle of women presents difficulties under [the refugee] definition.").

1

Nevertheless, "the rehgee definition, properly interpreted
claims!'"

. . . covers gender-related

For example, women who suffer gender-based persecution can still establish nexus if

they can show that the danger they fear is not merely "undifferentiated" v i o l e n ~ cbut
' ~ rather
that the danger exists on account of their membership in a particular social
Circuit has held that, for gender-related claims, "the focus

The Tenth

. . . should be not on whether . . .

gender constitutes a social group . . . but on whether the members of that group are sufficiently
likely to be persecuted that one could say that they are persecuted 'on account o f their
The inquiry therefore centers on whether the victim's characteristics as a
member of a particular social group elicit within the persecutor a motivation to harm the victim,
Furthermore, as
the precise nature of the persecutor's subjective intent is irrele~ant.~'~
mentioned previously, an applicant can satisfy the nexus requirement even if her protected
characteristics are not the sole cause of the persecution.216
The reasoning of the U in Matter of Maria T. is instructive in the present context. The U
in that case cited Kasinga for the proposition that "nexus can be established by either showing

2

1
' Guidelines
~
~ on~International
~
~ Protection, supra note 104, at 7 6 (emphasis added); UNHCR G u i d e l i i ,
supra note 108, 7 54 ('The Executive Committee of UNHCR has encouraged States to consider m u t e d ]
women . . as a 'social group' to ensure their coverage, but it is left to the discretion of countries to follow this
recommendation.").

.

' " ~ e eAhmed v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 611,619 (7th Ci. 2003) (Asylum claims based on membership in a particular
be examined to detnmine whether the danger flows from an ongoing violent struggle
social group "must
affecting the population in a relatively undifferentiated way or if danger exists on account of a protected ground;
only the latter will sufficeunder the [INA].").

.. .

' " ~ i a nv.~Gonzales, 422 F.3d 1187,1199-1200 (10th Cir. 2005).
Z's~itchersknia
v. LVS,118 F.3d 641, 647 (9th Ci.1997) ("That the persecutor inflicts the suffering or harm in an
attempt to elicit information, . for his own sadistic pleasure, .to 'cure' his victim, or to 'save his soul' . is
. It is the characteristic of the victim (membership in a group, religious or political belief, racial
irrelevant.
characteristic, etc.), not that of the persecutor, which is the relevant factor.") (internal citations omitted).

..

..

..

..

the persecutor's own motives or the broader societal reasons for the persecution.9,217 n,

,

found that a broad recognition of nexus is justified where a state's failure to protect its citizens
from domestic violence is a contributing or substantial factor in that

If the U.S.

courts adopt this position, the failure of Mexico to prevent and punish gender-based violence in
Ciudad Juiirez could be sufficient to establish nexus. As mentioned previously, the prevailing
atmosphere of impunity in Ciudad Juirrez is a contributing factor in the continuing violence
perpetrated against these women.219
However, women fleeing the violence in Ciudad J u h z may still establish nexus beyond
reference to broader societal conditions. For example, in Maria T.,the U also cited evidence that

.

applicant's husband abused her because "he believed he had the right to . . because she was his
wife."u0 The U thus found that the husband was at least partially motivated by her status as a
woman in a domestic relationship.u1
The reasoning in Aguirre-Cervantes is also on point. The court in that case cited
evidence that "[dlomestic violence is purposell and instrumental behavior

. . . directed at

achieving compliance . . . so the abused person will become exclusively devoted to fulfilling the
needs

. . . of the batterer."2"

The court held that the abuser's goal %as to dominate and

persecute members of his immediate family." Although Aguirre-Cervantes is no longer binding

2 1 7 ~ a r T.,
i a at 4 (citing Kasinga, 21 I. & N . Dec. at 366) (emphasis added).
z's~d.
219

IACHR Report, supra note 2, at 7 128 ('The violence [in Ciudad Juhez] has its roots in concepts of the inferiority
and subordination of women. When the perpetrators are not held to account . . . the impunity confirms that such
violence and discrimination is acceptable, thereby fueling its perpetuation.")

U O ~ a r iT.,
a at 8.
221 1d.

"2242 F.3d at 1177 (internal citation omitted).

precedent,223the court's exploration of an abuser's motivation is compelling in that it represents
a shift away from the broad notion that violence against women is "normal" or
"undifferentiated." In other words, the court's analysis in Aguirre-Cervantes supports the notion
that, despite its pervasiveness, gender-based violence may be something more than common
crime; under some circumstances, gender-based violence is deliberate behavior targeted at
characteristics that the INA protects.
There is ample evidence that the violence against the women in Ciudad Juiirez is not
indiscriminate; these women are being targeted because of their gender and their
independence."4

The circumstantial evidence of nexus can be broken down into three

categories: (1) The correlation of increased violence against these women with the
implementation of NAFTA and the consequent expansion of the maquila industry (which gives
rise to the inference that the women are being targeted for their participation in this industry); (2)
the type of violence that is being committed (rape, sexual violence, murder); (3) evidence of
torture that indicates a desire to humiliate or punish. Individually and collectively, these factors
demonstratethat the violence in Ciudad J u h z is not "undifferentiated" but rather is taking place
on account of the victims' membership in the social group of Mexican women asserting their
independence.

'')see Aguirre-Cervantes v. INS, 273 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 2001) (vacating rehearing en banc per stipulation of the
parties).
zu~ntolerableKillings, supra note 6, at 25 ("Although murders of women can be attributed to many different
motives and perpetrators, many cases share common features that indicate gender-based violence; that is to say,
the gender of the victim seems to have been a signifcant factor in the crime, influencing both the motive and the
context as well as the type of violence suffered by the woman and the way in which the authorities responded to
it.") (emphasis added).

Conclusion
The murders of women in Ciudad Juhrez since 1993 are the tragic result of a convergence
of factors. First, Mexican society has traditionally limited the autonomy of women. The
prevalence of domestic violence in Mexico demonstrates that resistance to male domination, at
least within the confines of the home, can be met with violent consequences. Second, the
expansion of the maquiladora industry and of the city itself has shifted the demographics of
Ciudad Juhrez and has enabled thousands of young women to become financially independent.
Third, although no one is sure who they are or why they are concentrated in Ciudad Juhrez, the
perpetrators of these crimes seem to be unique in that similar patterns of violence cannot be
found throughout Mexico. Fourth, and perhaps most important, the state and federal authorities
in Mexico have been unable to prevent these crimes or bring most of the perpetrators to justice.
The international community and human rights organizations have raised awareness of
the problem in Ciudad Juiirez and have stimulated the Mexican and Chihuahuan governments to
take administrative and legislative action. Unfortunately, however, the mere existence of new
commissions or laws does little to provide actual protection to the victims, whose numbers are
steadily increasing.225 Thus, in the present context, the persistent failure of Mexican authorities
to apply Mexican law effectively, as well as Mexico's inability to llfill its international treaty
obligations, demonstrates that the women of Ciudad Juhrez cannot reasonably rely on the
Mexican legal system to vindicate their human rights.

U5TheUNHCR Guidelines on International Protection state that
Even though a particular State may have prohibited a persecutory practice . . . the State may
nevertheless continue to condone or tolerate the practice, or may not be able to stop the practice
effectively. In such cases the practice would still amount to persecution. The fact that a law has
been enacted to prohibit or denounce certain persecutory practices will therefore not in itself be
sufficient to determine that the individual's claim to refugee stahls is not valid.

UNCHR Guidelines on International Protection, supra note 104,T 11.

More research must be done to determine whether this state of lawlessness pervades the
entire Mexican criminal justice system. For example, it would be interesting to know whether an
executive of one of the maquiladoras would face similar obstacles in procuring state protection
from a kidnapping or murder threat. If such a threat were camed out, how would the Mexican
govemment respond? What resources would the government expend in investigating the crime?
Such information would be us&

in detennining the degree of the government's inability or

unwillingness to control violence against women in comparison to other groups of people.
What remains clear today, however, is that the government authorities in Mexico are not
protecting the women in Ciudad Juiirez. Given this context of violence carried out with
impunity, those women who are actual or potential victims and who flee to the United States are
refugees. Thus, these women should be eligible for relief under U.S. asylum law. First, there
can be no question that the types of harm that characterize the violence in Ciudad Juiirez, such as
sexual violence and murder, rise to the level of persecution. Second, depending on the specific
facts of each case, some of the women from Ciudad Juiuez may be able to establish that they
have suffered from past persecution or that they have a well-founded fear of future persecution.
The major obstacle in this step is that the woman must survive whatever happens to her that
forms her basis for reasonably fearing persecution if she were to return to Mexico.
Third, women who are asserting their independence, through either their work or their
education, should be considered a particular social group for asylum purposes. The background
information presented above establishes that Mexican society perceives these women as pushing
against traditional norms. Furthermore, the proposed social group of independent women in
Mexico meets the Gao standard of gender plus one or more identifying attributes. Although the
attributes that may comprise "independence" could manifest themselves in any number of ways,

they should all qualify as "fundamental" under the Acosta standard because women should not
have to give up their right to pursue their emotional, financial and intellectual independence.
Finally, the nature of the violence against women in Ciudad Ju6rez suggests that the
persecutors are targeting these women on account of their gender and independence. The
victims have been mostly young workingwomen or students. The violence includes rape,
mutilation of breasts and genitals, and murder. These facts give rise to the inference that the
women are not victims of random crime; they are being targeted because of their specific
characteristics. In other words, male maquiladora workers, women who do not challenge their
traditional roles, and women with enough resources to travel safely do not face the same threat
because they do not share the characteristics of the women who are being targeted in Ciudad
Jdirez.

In the final analysis, the women who are in danger of persecution in Ciudad Ju6rez
deserve protection. The Mexican government will not afford them protection, so they should at
least be eligible for protection in the form of asylum in the United States. This is the
fundamental purpose of asylum law.

